

Cuba

"Hard" widows

Wyle:

[Thought for military: JFK was not a "great":  
his reactions are to be expected (not that different  
from the); and they are not easily thwarted  
(easy to underestimate his willingness to accept "loss" or  
the costs of inaction as alternative to military plan).  
So study his reactions, constraints — & relation to this.]

[Consider threat — to staff — of being "cut out" if they  
are critics, sceptics, etc.]

On demonstrations: If you let release all weapons when  
you use one, resistance by military;

If you do, danger of loss of control: and unwillingness  
by OAs.

[Now, 5 weapons can be released or at a time without  
releasing all. (or, without <sup>code</sup> deauthorizing).]

Request for weapons could reach higher command faster  
than info on which to base judgment.)



### Constraints to Anticipation

No use of nukes, removal of nukes from nukes; [London  
mission infeasible]; measures against unauthorized use;  
exemption of one or more countries from hostilities; geographic  
limitations on strikes; losses of targets; sanctuaries.

[Types of weapons: look at constraints considered  
in all future crises.]

Effect of nuclear role for dual-capable weapons:

- 1) Reluctance by military to expand them in HE war
- 2) Time for conversion: how long, on large scale?
- 3) Some commanders would rather have conventional  
warheads for AD that they would be allowed to use
- 4) More forces may go further into deep freeze in crisis.  
(How fast follow in Vietnam? CBAF in Cuba?)

(When does CACOR become SACOR? Note: when

a non-US nation gives in force.

When/what is agreement in NATO a precondition of action.

Sieverts Aug 27, '63

History

[ How sure were we that we would attack? ]

What made him that sure?

How surprising was blockade? JFK speech?

How worried was he on 23 Oct? Would blockade were less worried, him?

[ If SA-2 shootdown of U-2 was unauthorized — how much did it worry K? JFK? ]

If U-2 overflight was unauthorized, how much did it worry JFK? K? ]

[ Black-Box problem. Why did nations take the undesirable actions they did? Under what circumstances would they act the same — or different? ]

Not enough data, experience for input — without study — besides, inner structure changes. E.g., need look at the works? ]  
WHAT ARE SIGNIFICANT (or surprising) OUTPUTS OF THE PROC?

[Did SO think that "the problem" was to get  
some missiles on island — not, deployed —  
prior to detection? <sup>in "detection"</sup> Explain difference in SO move  
to Cuba, US move to Turkey; why didn't latter create  
crisis? What responsible act might we do?]

Would SO think it important to ~~not~~ postpone  
detection by a few days or weeks — even they were  
there? What if they had — so that our first  
look showed ready missiles?

Why would readiness have made us willing to attack?

How important in supporting our response was a US  
feeling that Turkish missiles were rather intolerable  
to US, indefensible? ]



Missile reports in August: either linked to SAM or  
mine, or down incorrect.

[Were there false alarms in Aug. Sept  
from intell analysts, as well as refugees?]

Suggestive reports after mid-Sept:

1) Specific zone in Pinar del Rio heavily guarded  
by Suro, Cuban Division.

2) oral comments by Castro aide: we have MRBM and  
3) " " " : some stone weapons.

4) sighting of tank coming with what looked like MRBM.

Early Sept. restrictions on leaving, based on DCI instruction  
that there should be greatest possible photo relief.

Aug 31 - Sept. restriction on use of 29 Aug flight.

Early Oct - Oct 11, restriction on IL-28's.

Oct 12<sup>-22</sup>: special leave system.

[Down: "create analysis" Sept 21 after mid-Sept; Sept 13 speech]

[Dynamic pattern? Early stage of potential crisis

→ "tension", fear of 'incidents' that would heighten

tension & raise prob of crisis (not yet believed

to be high) → constraints on a) info-gathering

(U-2 recon, ship movements) → delayed recognition of problem  
increased impact of "surprise"

and on b) alert, readiness.

[What if SALTs had been structured,  
& were threatened, prior to Oct 14?  
& consider dependence on photos!]

→ decreased readiness,

flexibility

→ increased vulnerability

Both increase chance of a first scramble

[Anyone seeing at a first scramble can -  
should win at these efforts. Have they?]

[Yet, if incident does occur, consider effect of that

on a) recon, b) readiness.

SALTs?  
U-2 over China; U-2 over S. Atlantic

WHAT IF THESE WERE HAPPENED PRIOR TO AUG 29?

(Wouldn't some see SA-2's report; but might have taken  
agent reports more seriously: maybe on overnight, esp. Sept 20!)

[Notes consequence of Best flight being first when  
it was — not later or sooner!]

[What would have been difference of our straight constraint  
on cloud cover?]

Sept 10: See State objection to Carter flight plan. extensive  
preliminal + overflight (cont + internal, cover) <sup>to look for</sup> cover 24/25.  
internal 4 flights, cover

[Why no proposal to look again at west end?  
Assumption on spread of installation?] [SAMPs?]

[Like mission on 10th cancelled? Why?] [Where?]

<sup>over NE</sup>  
Flight for 16th delayed then cancelled for weather. Over Pine

17 Sept: unusable photos. 18-21: cancelled for weather.

Not flown when weather good. 4 days before takeoff.

Between Sept 5 - Oct 14, 5 scheduled missions cancelled  
for bad weather over target; no other flown, but observed.

[Did Ex-Committer foresee this problem?]

Mission started to cover base from 22-26



Flight program completed Oct 7.

Flight test: mostly SA-2 to find out if operational? (P)

From RB 8.11. - Oct 2, reports mutual suspicion

among analysts of NRB: west of Vietnam

Cont. 'published' (?)

[Why not checked at  
immediately?]

Flight planned on Oct 9 to cover both

Oct 4: McC argued for extensive overflights.

[William did his suspicious start?] Special Group requested

study (by NRB on off, JCS, CIA) of alternative means of recon,

because of increased risk; meeting on Oct 9 to hear

report (see ?); planned flight: bad weather on 10-1307.

[Why does CIA plan create issue of overflying international  
waters, but SAC peripheral mission does not?]

[How did weather on Oct 14-22 — 20 missions flown —  
compare to NRB Oct 2-14?]

any  
Informed Oct 15: McEl, Kippert, Connolly, Taylor,  
Curl, Ball, Johnson, Martin, Halman, McEl,  
Carter, Bundy. [P.T.]

[Johnson? Kippert, Connolly?  
Cobby? Johnson? Who else was actually told?  
What did they do? What about? Felt? First  
responses? Did they know or expect JFK to be told?  
Orders? Time? Why tell them but not JFK?  
How unusual was this?

At first meeting, were Johnson, Robinson, Ditzel, Smith there?  
What versions, other than one version? Any? Responses?  
[What can be inferred about responses if news had  
been different?]

[If photos had revealed spec. missiles & alerts, with  
warheads - immediate air attack might well have  
been ordered. Johnson - would have been, without doubt!  
[Why? How come?]

Wednesday: meeting without Pals (was left in afternoon?)

One of first suggestions (was?) : treat hit U-2 in 1960  
("should" have been treated) : a "mistake" to be "corrected"  
"extremely"  
by limited air strike.

[Could we have <sup>yes</sup> ? How fast? How?]

[Did K prob. think that operational status of weapons  
would influence us — that early discovery would make  
us more willing to act?]

Rhetorical (?) question (was?) : why not first accept  
missiles? (NOTE: this would support our situation of  
1961 in Turkey, if we wanted that! Any action?)

[One position on Cuba a direct result of keeping out  
bases; any prediction of this?]

[What access to Oval history interviews or tapes on Cuba]



Early estimate of strike (WHOSE?): 50 sorties, 75  
bombs for MRBM; rather 100 sorties for airfield,  
100 for SAM; invasion needed 2000 sorties, 4000 bombs.

<sup>morning</sup>  
Jedrej Pres: 2 groups, "claw" + "paw" [WHO?]

[Also not formal ally of Israel; so blockade...]

IFK decision: <sup>of open? MRBMS</sup> presence could not be accepted.

Thus, opt: without Pres.

Re air strike: danger to other countries; to Kuantan;  
moral point of striking without warning, particularly as  
it bore on the inevitable (?) Cuban civilian casualties.

[Any thought to demonstration attack?] [Chen?]

[JCS opposed this on 16 Oct]

Blockade regarded as more unattractive, provocative,  
than limited air strike against nuclear base. (10-2 1960)

[How does that look now?]. Johnson had called.

blockade "act of war" on Oct. 6. But small  
threat looked like "incident": [possibly by harassment?]

U-2 shootdown. [Really?] Requirement first looked  
small. But might not have to make an issue. [! ?]

(Thursday)  
Wednesday Photos: none visible.

Trend to blockade.

Monaghan to S: "sincere hope" of his country for  
settlement of German question, important, no progress on  
Berlin.

[No threat on Berlin — as reported?]

A instructed to make it clear that to Cuba was only  
for the purpose of contributing to the defensive capability  
of Cuba. [not, defensive purpose?]

WFK: no threat of invasion to Cuba; would have been  
glad to give assurances to that effect if K had asked.

[So: guarantee was no new concession?]

G: Saw specialists in Cuba were giving training in handling  
certain kinds of defensive war. [they were spending  
MRSMS, SAMs]

[John Did G know and know? That DeBryen did not  
know.]

Thursday

10 pm : Pres

SV accountable. US must act, but "we have to  
and self-respect to respond by an act of aggression"

JFK: tentative decision to blockade, announce Monday

Directed detailed planning

Friday: Pres on Tour

Johnson returns to talk of air strike. Discussion

"although tentative Pres decision" ?

Decided to keep option open by having staff work  
done on both [Bundy? JFK?]

[Kennedy: JFK didn't believe blockade would be  
enough; wanted Bundy to keep "other" from preempting his  
decision by freezing planning on strike.]

[Johnson, via RW: JFK then "reverted" by military  
plans that actually emerged, turned away from strike,  
military, in Johnson.]



Friday night: both lines of action (blockade + large strike). "war game" at State + Defense. (How? 40?)

Stamps worked on paper for Pres.

W. Bundy paper over weekend

Final drafts of speech written by Stevenson. (see)

Sat. morning: Johnson scenario discussed (see)

(DeLeon?)

Pres: 2:30. Everybody, with Stevenson, Stamps, Smith

Discussion: large; almost certainly has to follow with invasion (?), Cuban civilian casualties would be high. Hardly conceivable. I'm not sure we would not report.

SEE  
militarily JFK's plan as presented was "not surgical," was "apt to go" (arg?) require massive commitments.

Operation was "only some of action compatible with our principles. Only a small risk the world 'pull the lanyard'."

// Evening: JFK talked to More later, to McMillan.  
(Newtall: jkt 11th)

No banyans on bases, Orders less of problem.

If construction continued, might be necessary to strike  
after minimum basis, unlikely SU would retaliate, esp.  
since SAC sent.

If <sup>even</sup> moving missiles were used against US, it might  
be necessary to invade, but not to use ones against Cuba;  
however, it might be necessary to make a compensating  
attack on SU.

[Any planning? Analysis?]

Sunday morning.

Till 10, when final approval to plan, possibility  
we would open with strike.

2:30 NSC, with Anderson (after decision?)

[How common was "calculus" approach? Did

A. Johnson insist this?

Monday

11:30 meeting of Excom  
Pres - message to Congress.

3: formal meeting of NSC (McDermott)

established Excom - initial appearance of disunity;  
saying one thing

Apportioning of not saying strike or invasion had been  
considered (& rejected):

Why no quantitative analysis? Lack of "hard" evidence  
to convince others; & opinion of experts that SC  
missiles were unlikely.

Note: Congress reaction - via strike, invasion

(see Taylor, McN first views?!!)

Macmillan reply to Bruce Belfrage, 6 Monday: it's not just  
not so much in precedent as in unprecedented condition of  
the modern world in a nuclear age.

Must be ready for vital action against Berlin, as well  
as persons or weaker parts of the Free World defense system.



Monday night:

[Find out: Rest - Delage talk, 22 Oct.]

- through,

10:40-11:45 McN and Anderson

and briefing on nuclear weapons. (?)

Tuesday evening:

Rest to Ball: We've won a considerable victory,  
you and I are still here. [Did Rest believe this?]

[Munsterdt: Bundy & JFE did not; issue was  
not immediate Holocaust, but slippery road.]

[Why did SO persist in denying presence of minister?]

[What did this "convey" to us?]

Excomm: 10. 3 subcommittees. Berlin, adverse planning,  
comm.

Nitze. comm. inter-allied relationships.

Check with her

Advantages of not telling allies they would not be  
able to tie our hands, & would be free to divorce  
themselves.

*in Ntj's room.*

Fear that Mac would force JFK to engage  
against some course of action.

(Over?)

Tuesday. Memo for JFK (via Asst): Taylor, Talbot & Posters

involvement for MRBM to Europe; privately

urge Jinks to place out facilities as soon as MLE----

available? prohibitive? Agreement by Ernst Powers to

discontinue from displaying MRBM to Canada or ME (but, MLE?)

SEE

7 pm Proc of Introduction

8 pm McN said 25,000 ships enroute to Cuba,

their course unchanged [TRUE?]

in past 24 hrs.

but of all other variants as well [!] would  
be different.

If assurances were given by the Pres. and the govt.  
of the US that the USA itself would not participate  
in an attack on Cuba and would restrain others from  
actions of this sort, if you would recall your fleet,  
this would immediately change everything. I am not speaking  
for Fidel Castro, but if that is what he and the govt. of  
Cuba, evidently, would declare, denouement and would  
appeal to the people to get down to peaceful Cuba.  
Then, too, the question of armaments would disappear, since, if  
there is no threat, the armaments are a burden for every  
people. Then, too, the question of destruction, not only of  
the armaments which you call offensive, but of all other  
armaments as well, would be different.

As the Pres. shows statesmanlike wisdom I propose  
we, for our part, will declare that our ships, bound for



Friday morning: 10. 2pm (with Stevenson) (Adelson?)

Work on minutes continuing. E. [Plot fewer charts  
of low crisis]. All still increased.

Does still pushing.

deal of Fomin + Scali; directly under UN supervision.

pledge by Castro not to accept offensive weapons (?)

in Cuba; pledge by US not to invade.

Scali, Adelson, Rusk. (Chief. Sonnenfeldt?)

Scali - Fomin 7:45: real possibilities, time short.

Also, perhaps at UN and by low. Castro. to administration.

[W44?]

Letter began writing at 6; had been translated  
by US Envoy in Moscow. [so, not influenced by Scali]

Letter: if answered by Pres, and if flatly recalled, this would  
immediately change everything else, the question of the  
destruction, not only of the means to which you call offensive.

Cuba, will not carry any kind of armament. You would  
declare that the US will not invade Cuba with its  
forces and will not support the any sort of forces which  
might intend to carry out an invasion of Cuba. Then the  
necessity for the presence of our military specialists in  
Cuba would disappear.

Epstein recovered at 10 pm to discuss.

Agree to treat as bona fide offer. Drafting on reply to  
State on 2/4. (Re mention of Berlin, or Turkey;  
though, no explicit offer to remove, suggested Castro's consent  
needed; asked guarantee of Cuban security — difficult  
domestically for US)

[Did Nitze, Poston know?]

no POB blockade, notifying US aircraft etc (?) or possible in Berlin.

1st morning:

Excom at 10. Discussing draft reply [check]

Memorandum, Radio Moscow letter: offer to remove;

Early inspection.

Memorandum (checklist 1): O-2 shot down.

O-2 surplusing. (Low fighter scrambled to within range,  
fire on plane. Castro vowed to shoot down plane

[Says system] [when?]

Refers landed.

[When: JFK attacks on City, Sunday]

Decision by Pres: first set of action letter basis for  
solution against Castro.

Excom at 4: consider personal replies.

2 planes fired on. Pres approved two messages to K.

Letter sent at 5:05 pm.

late that night, message to K letter call NAC.

Excom at 9. discussion of additional steps next day: and  
is POC blockade, mobilizing US aircraft shot (?) or a possible air strike.



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NIE 11-3-57 (15 Dec 57)

~~Probable~~ Intell. Warning of ~~our~~ Attack on the US

[Alternatives, threats, as: warning  
conditional prediction of one's own action  
<sup>statement</sup>  
evidence of conditional decision  
(Would threaten under risk  
but, give odds that he would  
carry it out? Does he  
expect to?)

[Play to get Rous. to do A, which either don't want to do:  
get them to agree to threaten to do A if third party S  
does & doesn't to Y; get them to commit US prestige, etc.  
Then for (A)  $\equiv$  for (S will lead to do Y, etc.) — which may be  
legible "If you don't come up to 20 days supply,  
we'll come down."

[Thus, reflect the fact that doing A not only hurts US  
but also hurts S, whom we wish to influence.]

[The danger of explosion in crisis confrontations rests partly on values, emotional reactions to events as they occur, but partly partly on theories as to the "inevitable" course of events on the nature of the opponent or the "possible" alternatives. Cf: "dangerous theories"

(any use of one nuclear must lead to all-out war - breven)  
(Explosive theories). [Mobilization  $\rightarrow$  War]  
[Inability to tell apart from total mob] [When did Icarus "decide" on War?]

Probability of warning: What hypotheses — as to possible enemy plans, courses of action, goals, values — will evidence be related to? intents

(Also problem of observational/reporting uncertainty: given instruments, what is probability that  $X$  has occurred, given a report, even claims, that  $X$  has been observed by means  $S$ ? Then, what is  $pr(H_0|X)$ ?

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To interpret SU moves (preparation, deter, threats, insurance  
decision to attack. — "How likely to  
they that it is that they will attack?

Or, that war will occur?

To identify long-odds bits — things they would do only  
if prob of war or attack were high; then try to  
observe these: a) with high prob b) with high confidence  
in observation; c) early.

[This "unequivocal" indication can be valuable without  
(a), given (b) + (c).]

To interpret, must have some good info on US-Allied  
moves that may have triggered (French plans in  
consider) SU "response." To identify possible "signals"  
in advance, so as to monitor or suppress, know

- 1) Our operations, intentions;
- 2) SU collection sources  
(prob prob > 0);
- 3) SU model of our behavior; hypotheses they are testing, and  
likelihood functions. Their likelihood functions, 'interpretations' of  
weight of evidence, might depend on "level of tension."



The disadvantage of the MCF concept was always that it focused attention on contingencies for which national forces seemed still more suited.

It was always a bad idea that nations could be 'bought off' with MCF: it involves costs, and to justify them requires emphasis on needs for which national forces are better.

(If neither is bought, - ~~so~~ fixed costs are high for significant or adequate effectiveness - result is just higher regret, frustration, anxiety, insecurity.)

	$\bar{E}$	$E$	
cost more, but (and more) gets more A	-16	2	{ Best shelter National det.
B	-9	1	
Can't	0	0	{ Worst shelter MCF

Change B can be justified (over C) only if  $Pr(E) > \frac{2}{10}$ ; but if that is accepted, A will look still better (to subjects; whereas 'persuader', e.g. US, may find much worse, even given E).

(i.e. before changing S's opinion, inspect his preferences & alternatives, which may differ from yours.)

Turning Points

Crisis Report, Aug. 1963

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SU missiles from USSR began serious  
about 1957?

SU massive attacks became relatively unlikely after  
(1952, 3, 4?)

SU parity with US in strat means came... (ygt?  
1962?)

[Two threats: a) initial SU challenge

"broaden or  
prolong" "hostile  
local action"

b) SU decision to enlarge conflict after  
NATO responds (two weeks) to challenge.

("expanded attack: after probe, etc.")

(both more likely than before,  
given current SU/US posture,  
though: how likely?)

[~~SU~~ SU decision (b) now likely because Political Directorate

strat. concepts no longer valid or plausible: risk of mass + GW

on SU for any "expanded local action" in Europe. Hence, Allies  
probably unwilling, in the event, to reply to challenge at all,  
hence, challenge more likely.



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Rejection of "limited nuclear war in Europe":  
 Detering Alliance.  
 (Croatia? Spain?)

~~But~~ But : SO would not continue in non-nuc combat  
 — risks of 3rd by accident — escalation — US attention —  
 unless tactical victory were close at hand.

Some: "an 'adequate' non-nuc defense is defined reasonably,  
<sup>concretely</sup> if, imprecisely, as one that could contain any Soviet conventional  
attack based on ready forces for a sufficient  
time for the wider risks to become clear... The time  
 perspective should be measured in weeks, or at the most  
 months, rather than years. [Though, not.]

"wider risks" = "no immediate take of the victory  
 & significant & increasing chance of nuc → GW."

[Was SSR surprised — unhappy to see land SO  
 minutes appear? ~~unhappy to see land SO~~

Example where misleading thinking is a function of  
 "bad events" — which subverts forward policy.  

	E	S	
(Preferred policy)	+10	-8	tendency to focus on "worst case"
alternative	+10	-10	or to magnify its prob

(esp. where preferred policy has favorable events in other contingencies)



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Assume

Potential advantages of threats & limited challenges  
may go up, as risks go down, given current NATO  
strategy, which makes any NATO response frightening to  
allies (but perhaps essential to country challenged);  
provides diversity, split.

[But it would lead would SO feel that  
expansion <sup>easy to your victory</sup> would bring grave risks of nuances or GW?  
What do we say? Plan? Want them to believe?]

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if SU say "no limited war":

1) Do they then, contemplate, exercising any  
"hostile local actions"? (e.g., bombing).

2) Do they then expect no Western response?

If they expect response, do they propose  
to go to general war? Are they certain  
that we will?

50

Emphasis on prescription focuses attention on:

When do SO think that war has become  
imminent, unavoidable?

[How SO forces over time, 1950's?] <sup>since Korea, much  
forces drawn from  
S. 75 m to S. 6 m</sup>

[B missile? ALCM? Bomb art? Anti-art?

US anti-art? Big warheads?

[SO doctrine implies that they will retain big non-miss  
capability - whether they value it or not.]

[But: if big cuts are possible: let's not beat them to it.]

[3] What if SO turn up with big ABM program; demonstrate  
anti-satellite; effects on US CD, ABM programs?

3) What if SO acquire bases in other countries

C & S SO in Theater zone

4) Pure deterrent GW capability?]

Est: SO will attempt to offset US superiority by means other than numbers,  
CBMs, space, high yield, sub, land

4FCW. SO hopes to achieve clear strat. superiority by 1970 breakthrough  
at intermediate.

[See Vienna notes] [K. Utter]



JNC

[ Another misinterpretation:

SU CF Doctrine (UK!)

But if they forget, any minimum deterrence... ]

[ we don't say Civil Defense; + prob of GW is low...  
+ prob of <sup>US</sup> 2<sup>nd</sup> strike is very low...

But: our program, based on CF, keeps them low...

NSAM

55 Relationship of JCS to Pres

82 Allied Mil. Buildup

102 Contin. Planning in Berlin

NATO SU

[Bureau of analogy of COMA Graduate, etc. with  
"Missile Gap"; consider IRBM estimates.]

Emphasize NATO capability to deal with some  
major non-nuc contingencies; focus on lower nuc;  
continue "raising the threshold" without making  
commitments / gambles on assumption of non-nuc  
"adequacy."

[Local hostile action — big — could arise without  
SU aggression: e.g. FRG response to act.  
uprising.]

[Political Directorate statement of problem is sound;  
but solution no longer acceptable — in particular  
as interpreted 1953-61.]

[As MC 14/2 to be made: No concept of limited nuclear  
war in Europe, or with Soviets; or prolonged, uncontrolled,  
but limited, non-nuc war. (Seems no concept of limited nuc war.)



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[For my project: 1) Collect statements of US/NATO  
conditional predictions, conditional expectations; +  
prior probs.

2) Estimates of SO conditional impact.

3) Evidence on " " "

4) Conflicts in above, v with Allies.

e.g. NATO stresses spurious effects of mass-arm buildup on  
Berlin crisis; + threat of nuc attack developing out  
of crisis.

Make goal: SU cannot hope to defeat NATO non-nuc  
forces with anything less than a  
prolonged effort by matrimonial & undeclared non-nuc attack,  
or by nuc weapons. UNC

Distinguish between: a) prolonging, at low level  
(giving chance to Allies to mobilize, & threaten  
or take offensive action) (not just, make SU  
broadened response more safe for SU, US more  
response less likely); remember restraints of SU  
offers to negotiate, as in Korea; how likely that  
Alliance can make credible threats to force nucs  
after low-key hostilities?

b) broadening, or raising scale of  
violence. US can more plausibly threaten GW or  
use of nucs to avoid almost-certain defeat,  
than to terminate or win a prolonged, limited  
non-nuc local conflict.

[Give another time for counteroffensive action]

1950

NATO plans issue always recognized possibility  
of SU attack with limited objectives, relation of  
this to SU nuc & non-nuc power (contrast to:  
a) 1/3 SU nucs b) SU nuc monopoly; c) overwhelming  
SU non-nuc superiority <sup>by</sup> plus SU nuc superiority  
(tac; strat), and likelihood of Allied non-nuc response

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<del>SW</del> No tac or strat moves Big non-mue response That case GW	+ few strat moves + tac moves + tac moves + strat moves - non-mue info (exp, - air)
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+ big strat move + non-mue + tac moves	GW for tac moves further, had for Guevara + SW, not for US
----------------------------------------------	------------------------------------------------------------------------

- low strat move + lots of non-mue (+ air) + tac moves	Non-mue (Dimon see moves GW)
--------------------------------------------------------------	---------------------------------------

Non-mue weakness is a signal of increased likelihood of non-response within a given (short) time interval only given that conflict is joined at all: that a military response of some sort is made, by allies.

But this is likely to be doubted by SW.



Saw military Capitalists & Officers, 1962-67

as major underlying aim to contribute to effective defense.

forces, willingness to plan, back - for war; 4) resolve not to be defeated.  
not one ever shows - unable to press or enforce its views.

military warriors.

NATO

US commitment is a license for European leaders to negotiate certain "responsibilities insurance" — which they would otherwise have had to pay heavy premiums on, somewhat independent of the prob of the threat (which they regarded as low) or the effectiveness of the capabilities (low, given high fixed costs of significant capability, big SO & capability). This amounted to having US take over their insurance premiums : without cost to US, since : a) prob of challenge thought low or zero, b) low <sup>existing</sup> marginal cost to US, since SAC needed owing to US, c) little effect on ~~foreign~~ insurance would not have to be paid (US needn't even pay premium).

As with Skybolt: Her didn't care whether Skybolt  
worked, or even whether it ever got it — so long as  
he could tell public it "was coming" — as excuse for  
cutting Blue I Trust, Blue Steel.

Specially irritating to European politicians if public's  
view of prob of war — or US — is greater than his: so that  
US keeps backslapping him to contribute to effective defense.

times, & willingness to plan, back - see notes; d) resolve not to be defeated  
not only our interests - ourselves; able to discuss or defend its views.

Military matters.



as Early plan to withdraw to Cyrenes; they wanted to  
avoid having to plan that (like planning a test  
conflict: personal responsibility, regret; would planner  
have considered the "planned" interference, if it occurred?

Distinguish effect of plan in allocating <sup>as "best"</sup> responsibility,  
personal risks, from causal influence of plan upon  
actual events. (Plan usually taken to imply that if  
planner could have carried perfectly, he should have  
planned as he did: thus, it reveals his values, what he  
is single way; assuming planner expects, or hopes, that  
plan will be followed literally, in the event.

To what extent did he will, desire, choose, intend,  
anticipate (actual) consequences? (Did he imagine or  
consider them at all?)

ones, of willingness to plan, hope - for ones; if resolved not to be defeated.  
not all even interests as concepts; insurance & coverage means we  
able to press or enforce its views.  
military matters.



4. "Local defense" has different meaning for Germans;  
it could be needed against a local attack;  
whereas the Allies, who preceded Germany in NATO,  
might "need" local defense only in context of all-out SU  
attack. (when it would scarcely matter, given nuclear exchange.)

5. What impact did British withdrawal of 1961 have on M-N's  
enthusiasm for NATO reserve divs?

6. Do recent US policy papers ever define (like 100/11)  
contingencies that would require use of nuclear, even  
given MC 26/4? Or, early use?

Ex: not only "massive" invasions, but surprisingly  
for comfortingly sufficient SU advances. Specifying  
unfavorable circumstances that would probably require  
use of nuc, either early or eventually (if ?) permitted.  
(e.g., under current conditions; evaluate changes in this).

Then, show 3) reactions, & (4) willingness to contemplate use of  
nuc, 5) willingness to plan, prepare for nuc; 6) resolve not to be defeated.  
as all these interests so interrelated; essential to sovereignty because we  
able to press or inform its views.  
military matters.

7. Issue for European critics of US: is there a threat  
to Europe (or, to someone) in EU's military strength?  
Is there a problem there which it is the responsibility  
of Europe to solve? Would there be, if US  
did not exist?

3. Enttousen = interview with 10 December, April, 1962.

Answer: US + EU already have made an alliance;  
no alliance against thermonuclear war.

Danger that they would: [a] conduct limited  
non-nuclear war in Europe, which US would be content to  
lose or to allow SU to invade, without using force at  
all. [b] wage a limited nuclear war in  
Europe, with US + EU sanctions. Hence, European  
action need [the need] <sup>to reduce</sup> strategic weapons: to reduce  
SU certainty that it could be a sanctuary, while  
invading or destroying European country.

General harmony of interest between US + France, dependence  
of France on US; but, circumstances could arise in which they did  
not all their interests so identical; essential to sovereign France be  
able to press or enforce its views  
military matters.



✓

[ But: world of Alliance to US depends on degree to which France focuses attention & efforts upon contingencies in which they anticipate a conflict of interest. What resources are they devoting to improving common effort in situations where they see common interest? ]

7. What accounts for persistent differences in estimate of the nature & urgency of the SU threat? What agreement upon evidence, model?

Why did European put danger <sup>40</sup> low in late '40's?  
How great was difference: how high did US put danger? what effect? Even various measures expected & have?

military matters.



10. Value of insurance, or, value of guarantee

That makes it unnecessary to consider a certain contingency at all: reduces it to zero.

Allan: worth of reducing prob from 1% to 0 is more than from 90% to 37%.

Costs of attention. Fiscal cost of enumeration, consideration. Pressing demands of certain problem, objectives, if they must be considered. Non-linear utilities: where terrible outcome (e.g., invasion) is at issue, improvement (e.g., better peace) has disproportionately large benefit (in eyes of public, anyway).

Therefore, the savings — or, improvement w.r.t. other objectives or contingencies — involved in being able/allowed to ignore certain problem, contingencies much greater than from any <sup>other</sup> equivalently large reduction in probability.

Planning "assumptions":

Ex: Reaction to Kent report: feasibility of small CO program.

Measure of effect of CO guarantee on English subjective "security peace-of-mind": degree of public ignorance, unconcern, w.r.t. military matters.

11. Why is "consistency" so urgent? Allinor has lived with it for 14 years. Is SO threat greater?

(Probably No; but, our expectation that it will be greater, say, 2 years from now, probably greater). How high is it? ✓

Is economic burden to US so great? (Imagine European advancing statistics on US "ability to pay, - to flow"; compare with past; since how important US regards increased capabilities, vs. "consistent" or "equitable" capabilities.

(Would Europeans agree with McN on prob. of SO attack on Turk. missiles?)

## Wishful Reasoning

(Putting certain facts of "hard" events as high  
that <sup>3/4</sup> some problems become insoluble, signatures unattainable  
(subsequently, as personal responsibility, since, become to ignore)  
& irrelevant; 4) certain policies - chosen for other reasons  
are preferred (inaction, status quo; one that one is "committed  
to; a past recommendation).

1. 175 SU dives; Red/yellow borders; SU determination to  
maintain superiority...

TN Wars:

2. End of all life on earth... (Mellman)
3. Counter-attack by SU inevitable.
4. Escalation, or war of mass, inevitable.
5. US-preferred SU attack.
6. NATO-preferred SU attack (all-out; millions on all, including...)
7. Very high fixed costs for any significant effectiveness (e.g. conventional  
forces)



With US maneuvering of ones: a) it needed bases in Europe, to use SAC; <sup>for my reason</sup> b) bases in Europe were needed; c) bases could be bought with promise to use them to use SAC, if and be, to retaliate to attract on Europe.

12. SO reductions in divs not as great as Brown + Johnson contemplated; but reductions in SO too are much greater.

13. p. 48: a reason for inconsistency between forces + "policy": US (Congress) insisted on policy statements; and if you're going to have a policy statements...

15. 100% readiness for fight; need for counter-offensives;  
perhaps decision prior to negotiation; importance of  
holding Territory. (Staley; Stockfish).

New basis for large number of divisions, esp.  
"lesser aggressions."

In principle (Staley) this could mean greatly larger  
reserves, to mobilize for really large contingencies  
initiation; but problem of credibility here (Adams's  
hints are too grandiose).

But (Staley), could consider commitment-sized ready  
forces: ~ 2.5 well-equipped divisions; w.r.t. needs for  
lesser aggressions, with quickly mobilizable reserves  
to "hold line." (Initiatives limited to 1-4 divs.).

## CUBA

Aftermath:

- 1) Khrushchev's letter revealed to USSR on Nov 5;  
revealed to USA, State, WH, & heights of crisis,  
27 Oct (Saturday) (Eaton writing memo for  
President on Sat & Sunday). Little attention.

Also, McNamara's letter in Nov: "SU take care of it"

Also, UK-US cooperation with cooperation over Berlin.

(Khrushchev away on India).

- 2) US <sup>Proposed</sup> ~~affirmed~~ response for Berlin happened to come to  
MAG on week following Cuban crisis.

Consider events leading up to Cuba as a failure of  
"communication", listening, inference (SU misreading of  
US response; US misreading of SU intention, estimates,  
actions. Warning is successful, accurate, timely  
inferred (+ prediction), but, failure of effort to prevent.

(Does crisis warrant confidence in efficacy of comm,  
offering lessons of failure to prevent crisis or recognize it.  
invasion of Cuba, ... never



## Crisis:

1) What sorts of measures — public, private — is SC likely to take to be deliberately reassuring?

2) to be deliberately confusing, threatening, or misleading?

3) To what extent does SC give contradictory signals to different audiences? To what effect? How would you gauge reaction?

4) What sorts of signals tend to be interpreted unwittingly as deliberately communications? How common?

(Distinguish: a) communication: receiver believes sender intends to inform, or influence opinion, & intends receiver to believe this.

b) inadvertent signal.

(Medical: sign & symptom?)

5) What sorts of attitudes, known "neutralize evidence":

lead to discounting or ignoring potentially revealing evidence.

a basis for conscience; or, foregoing useful tests, observations?

What attitudes "unlock alarms, detectors": Pearl Harbor, Munich, invasion of France, ... Berlin, Cuba

U

## Type II Deterrence

Phase I: US threaten to kill many Russians, in combination with (non-nuclear) / ground war; no US or Europeans.

Phase II: US threaten to kill very many Russians (bigger forces, H-bombs) though at cost of some Europeans + <sup>few</sup> US.

III US threaten to kill most Russians, though at cost of many most Europeans and <sup>some</sup> may US.

IV Cost of US attack could be most Europeans, many US (depending on SU tactics).

Nuclear Explosion; Recovered Nuclear; Rapture of the ship. Polaris

162/2 Nuclear weapons to be considered available for use.

English pressure for H-bombs, the weapons. What it considered distinguishing between A and H bombs?

Aug: 23 July

[Would not Option 1 leave a major role for UK's force?

NATO the one first-strike force? What would it take?

to get MRBM/IRBM? What would be left?

D What would nature/signature be of the one first strike without letting IRBM/IRBMs?

Aug:  
[Force designed for GW function; even more cap a bonus.]

[Clarify for Europeans:



6 fines: Digby; 655; and Stillman prepared for Planning Study.  
all Kent. Lusk:

V

Effect of payoff function and alternatives considered,  
on probabilities:

Former determines "relevant facts, hypotheses, states of nature, results: information"; latter, influences choice of grouping of hypotheses considered. But this affects the interpretation of evidence. (very low prior prob. may be associated with a hypothesis buried in a composite hypothesis; given resulting likelihoods, evidence may not favor that composite, though it would very strongly favor that hyp. if it were considered "relevant" enough to examine separately, despite its low prior prob.; hence, the final prob. after observations.

Change the payoffs, or alternatives considered, and you may already change the impact of observations on opinions.

From this point of view, it is unrealistic to consider inference outside of decision context: unless hypotheses can usefully be taken as "given."